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I develop a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generation model with endogenous fertility,
human capital accumulation and intergenerational transfers to investigate the quantitative effect
of one-child policy in China after 1980. The intergenerational transfers from mid-age worker to
their old parents act as a channel through which parents have incentive to invest in quantity and
quality of children. A calibrated version of the model implies that exogenous fertility restrictions
imposed by one-child policy increase expected years of schooling by 2.91 years on average during
policy periods, and the resulting faster human capital accumulation would generate a annual gain
of moderate 5.01% in GDP per worker decades after the policy enacted. Quantitative results also
suggest that the policy decreases population growth by 1.23% points on average in 1980 − 2020,
and generates large shift of population age structure during demographic transition from high to
low fertility. When dependency ratio reaches the peak around 2030, the share of old-age dependents
rises by 17.8% points and the share of mid-age workers decreases by 5.92% points, compared to the
no-policy scenario. The theory also predicts that for poor regions who generally face more binding
fertility restriction, the policy offered greater incentive to invest in children’s quality, leading to a
temporarily faster income growth.
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Capital, and Economic Growth :
The Consequence of One-Child
Policy in China
1.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, China experienced a spectacular economic transformation which in-
cluded not only one of the biggest economic booms and widespread privatization on both agriculture
and industry, but also a rapid human capital accumulation and radical change in demographic struc-
ture. Almost simultaneously with the Chinese economic reform from 1979, one-child policy, as the
most influential birth control scheme in human history, was introduced to mitigate the fast popula-
tion growth to adapt to the cultural mode of modernization. After its implementation, fertility rates
are significantly falling over the last 30 years, which created an increased share of the working-age
population and hence a boost to per capita income growth. During 1982-2010, total fertility rate has
dropped about 54%, declining from 2.6 in 1980 to 1.2 in 2010. During the same time period, China
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has undergone a sustained increase in human capital accumulation, with expected years of schooling
rising about 56%, from 8.05 years in 1982 to 12.58 years in 2010. On October 29,2015, China made
a change from one-child policy to two-child policy. Chinese government claimed that the one-child
policy is responsible for preventing 400 million excess births, which fueled Chinas dramatic post-
1978 economic boom. However the acclamation is questionable, since with economic growth and
development, gradually established social security system and associated rising educational costs,
fertility would decline because people tend to have fewer children and small families, which is widely
observed in the history of developed countries.
Empirical evidences also show that since 1990, this policy is less effective in east and northeast
provinces. In 2000, eight provinces in East and Northeast area already had total fertility rate below
1, indicating that this policy is not binding at all in these provinces. At the same time, a sizable
decrease in fertility rate can be observed in Middle and West provinces, all of which are still under
the influence of compulsory birth control . Due to its disparate impact across regions, the economic
consequences of one-child policy would varied from East provinces to West provinces.
After its decades-long enforcement, one-child policy began to caught some attentions from academia
in recent years. Choukhmane, Coeurdacier and Jin (2014) develop a life cycle model and argue that
the fertility restrictions provide incentives for households to increase their childrens education and
concludes that the policy significantly increased the human capital of the only child generation and
accounted for large rise in aggregate savings. These effects on household saving was also examined in
Ge, Yang and Zhang (2012) paper by cohort analysis. They focus on how the demographic structural
change shaped by the policy has impact on saving decisions made by different cohorts of household.
However, one-child policy is still heavily under-studied. Several questions associated with it come
up. How quantitatively the policy distorted people’s fertility choices and human capital investment
during post-reform period. Whether the birth control policy contributed to China’s economic output
although it is judged as the most cruel government policy in human history. And how it has shifted
the demographic structure for the whole society. What are the consequences when it is totally
abandoned. And how does it has impacted the economic disparity across regions.
To investigate its effects on these issues, in this paper, a general equilibrium overlapping generation
model is developed and employed with endogenous human capital investment, fertility choice, and
inter-generational transfer from mid-age children to their parents. Having children is assumed to
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bring positive utility to parents since people are willing to have children. Furthermore, children can
be treated as one kind of insurance for old-age people due to the potential transfer payments from
them; also educating children well is helpful to generate future benefits when they grown up, which
may become a potential economic gain for parents. According to the model, school efficiency are
calibrated for 28 provinces and the whole country. It shows that the province facing a better school
efficiency in time period t associates with a higher level of GDP per worker in next time period.
The reason is that a better school efficiency indicates a lower time cost of educating children, and
it does trigger a higher human capital investment from parents on children. One facing better
school efficiency at young age has higher human capital stock when she grows up, and the resulting
higher human capital stock could contribute to a higher level of real GDP per worker. The model
also predicts that with birth control, a obvious drop in fertility rate can successfully lead to faster
human capital accumulation. The declines in fertility caused by the policy cause larger shift of
population age structure during demographic transition. Quantitative results imply that the share
of non-productive dependents rises from 55% to 72%, while the share of mid-age workers declines
from 45% to 28% from 1990 to 2030. When dependency ratio reaches the peak around 2030, the
share of old-age dependents would be increased by 17.8% points and the share of mid-age workers
would be decreased by 5.92% points, compared to the no-policy scenario.
The theory yields additional predictions which is consistent with the evidence of Chinas economic
inequality across regions. From establishment of the country, inequalities in output per worker
gradually got deeper over time, and continued to proceed after 1980. But this pattern changed after
2000, an obvious catch-up was observed on most provinces in northeast, middle and west region.
Figure 1.1 suggests that most of the east provinces face a relative loose constraint by the one-child
policy, due to sizable lower fertility rates they already reached before the policy started. In 2006,
for most east and northeast provinces, fertility constraint was even not binding, while all west and
middle except two are still under its constraints. Due to the disparate influences, poor provinces
under greater policy pressure has to decrease their fertility, inevitably inducing a higher investment
in education according to the theory. This resulting rise in human capital accumulation helped West
and Middle provinces to achieve a faster income growth for later generations, which is suggested by
counterfactual simulation. At the same time, richer provinces under almost zero pressure from the
policy would choose fertility and human capital investment as they like, as a result, the policy can
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not induce the surge in income growth in these area. The theory in this paper successfully predicts
a smaller gap in GDP per worker between rich and poor provinces occurs during policy period,
compared to no-policy scenario.
This paper is also part of literature related to fertility, human capital accumulation and income
growth. From the Barro and Becker (1989) paper, they provides a standard general equilibrium
model where parents make choices of fertility along with decisions on consumption and intergenera-
tional transfers to children. They assumed that parents can get utility from their own consumption
and from their offspring. Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) then develop a growth model with
endogenous fertility and investment in human capital, where agent is facing two kinds of budget
constraints: time and resource. Under the key assumption that the rate of return to human capital
rises as human capital stock increases, the paper generates multiple steady states: undeveloped
scenario with large family size and little human capital investment, and the developed scenario with
small family size and large amount of human capital investment. Their paper actually captures
Malthusian and neoclassic elements. Later, in the Murphy, Tamura and Simon (2008), Tamura
and Simon (2016), Murphy, Tamura and Simon (2016) papers school efficiency as key parameter is
incorporated into the model to capture difference in time cost of human capital investment across
space and time.
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) began to incorporated the role of children as old-age insurance for parents
into their OLG model. Parents invest children’s education and receive future transfer committed by
self-enforcing contract. They also put forward the companionship function, which allows parents to
receive utility from quantity and quality of children. Following their work, Boldrin and Jones (2002)
endogenized the material support old parents receive from children in their OLG model. They
assumed that adult children cares about old parents’ consumption, and that they makes fertility
choices along with decisions on their own consumptions, saving and transfer to their parents with
either cooperative or non-cooperative mechanisms. In this paper, their model is extended to capture
human capital investment made by adult children.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 describe empirical evidence. Section 1.4




China’s one-child policy launched in 1980, and ended on October 29, 2015. Since then it was
replaced by a two-child policy. It was not the first population control policy since the founding of
P.R.China. During the time period of 1971-1979, there was a precedent one, known as later-longer-
fewer campaign in a voluntary basis, which put forward three goals: later childbearing, greater
spacing between first and subsequent children, and fewer children. During this period, fertility
dropped about 30%. The progress did not satisfy central government when it realized that young
age structure of population would produce economic growth. Then, one-child policy came into being.
According to the policy as it was most commonly enforced, a couple was allowed to have one child.
The policy is enforced at provincial level, and varies in accordance with local conditions. It allows
many exceptions. In most rural areas, if the first child of a couple was a girl, they were allowed to
have a second one. Some ethnic minorities can follow it on a voluntary basis. But for each couple of
the dominant Han nationality in urban areas, only one child is allowed to be born. Without a birth
permit, any pregnancy is considered “out-of-plan” and therefore illegal, and the pregnant mother
would be forced to undergo abortion in many places during certain time period. Without a birth
permit, fines were imposed on extra baby born in the family based on their income and other factors.
Thirty-five years after it launched, China announced a new birth control policy which allows every
family has two children, making an end of the one-child policy.
Figure 1.1 plots the fertility rates for 28 provinces (out of 31) during 1945-2010. The top left sub-
figure shows fertility rates for East provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Shandong, Fujian,
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang), the top right one presents the fertility rates for Northeast provinces
(Helongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin), the subfigures in left bottom and right bottom show the histori-
cal performance of Middle (Anhui, Hubei, Hunnan, Henan, Jiangxi, Shanxi) and West provinces
(Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunan, Inner Mogolia, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang),
respectively. Fertility rates for all provinces were actually falling down dramatically before the
introduction of one-child policy. Several empirical facts are summarized as the following:
1. For provinces in East and Northeast, fertility rates were falling down in 1960s, and sharp
decreases occurred before mid 1970s. (e.g. in 1963, fertility rate in Beijing is 6.9, while in
1974 it decreased to 1.3, and for Hebei province it decreased from 7.2 to 2.5.) For provinces
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in Middle and West part of China, fertility rates were falling down from early 1970s, a decade
later than in East.
2. After the one-child policy was introduced, no obvious decline in fertility for all provinces in early
1980s. At that time, family planning commission of China faced very strong public resistance
and put low pressure on local birth planning cadres during the period. With the issue of
Central Document 7 in 1984, Central Committee of the Communist Party reemphasized its
stand on fertility control and urged adapting propaganda in accordance with local conditions
(Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).
3. For most provinces in East and Northeast, fertility rates were already around 2 before 1980, and
did not decline a lot under the policy; for middle and west provinces, fertility rates experienced
a relative bigger falling after one-child policy was enacted.
Another important observation is the patterns on expected years of schooling1 for 30 provinces in
China. Figure 1.2 plots the expected years of schooling during the time period of 1949-2010. Almost
all provinces experienced fast growth until late 1960s. During culture revolution (1967-1977) a sharp
decrease in expected years of schooling occurred in every provinces. After that, for most of provinces,
it continued to rise over time. some Middle and West provinces have already began to catch up
most East and Northeast provinces since 1980s in the expected years of schooling.
During the same time the policy was enacted, Chinese economic reform was launched. A common
argument is that regional incomes have been diverging across China during the post-reform period
(Pedroni and Yao 2006). To observe the regional disparities more accurately, Figure 1.3 plots the
ratios of real regional output per worker for 28 provinces to that of Shanghai. The curves in left
top subfigure depicts the ratios for 9 provinces in East China. In right top subfigure, these curves
denotes the ratios for 3 provinces in Northeast China. The subfigures in left bottom and right
bottom, respectively, plot the historical performance for 6 provinces in Middle and that for 10
provinces in West. In the past 60 years, except for those provinces in East, all provinces account
for lower and lower ratios over time. The gap between rich and poor provinces continues to widen
after 1980 until 2000, since when obvious catching up can be pervasively observed in almost every
province.
1Expected years of schooling are the total number of years during which a child of age 7 can expect to spend full
time schooling in their youth. See Appendix B for more details
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So far, all provinces experienced sizable decline in fertility before and after the enforcement of
one-child policy, and sustained increase in human capital accumulation during the policy period,
which are measured by expected years of schooling. And income inequality is growing overtime
until recent decade. One feature of the model described in next section is that the decrease in
fertility associates with the increase in human capital accumulation, and the rate of human capital
accumulation affects income growth. This make it possible to discuss the role of one-child policy in
human capital accumulation and the income growth at national level and at provincial level.
1.3 Theoretical Analysis
Based on Boldrin and Jones (2002), Murphy, Tamura and Simon (2008), I develop a parsimonious
3-period overlapping generation model with endogenous fertility, human capital accumulation and
intergenerational transfer. The set-up is meant to capture the feature of Chinese society: children
are considered as a source of old-age support.
1.3.1 Set-up
Consider an overlapping generation model where people live up to three time periods: youth, middle-
age and old-age. Let Nt denote the population of mid-age people at time t. The total population,
denoted as Ntotal,t, is the sum of the number of young, mid-age and old-age people. That is,
Ntotal,t = Nt+1 +Nt +Nt−1. Suppose that in period t, old-age agents depend on the support from
mid-age agents and their savings to live. Mid-age agents work for one period and make decisions on
quantity-quality of children, along with transfer to parents , siblings’ transfer are taken as given.
Preferences. The life-time utility for mid-age agent includes the consumption at middle-age cm,t,
the consumption at old-age co,t+1, parent’s consumption at old-age co,t ,the benefits from having
children:
Ut = lncm,t + δlnxt + ηlnco,t + βlnco,t+1
where xt = nt(1 − ρt). nt is the number of children born by each individual, and ρt is the young
7
adult mortality rate at time t, considered as exogenous.
Budget constraints. The mid-age individual faces two resource constraints and one time constraint
at time t:





1 = lt + xt(τtλt + ν)
where ν is the fixed minimum time needed to rear each child, τt is the time spent on educating each
child, λt is the time efficiency of educating, πt is the amount of transfers to parents. And here I
assume that every child take their siblings’ transfer as given. Agent in mid-age rears and educates
children, make earnings by working lt hours, lends (or borrows) at amount at market-determined
interest rate Rt+1 and transfers part of earnings ,πt, to parent. When come to old-age, agent
receives transfer from children, collects (or pays) principal and interest if he lent (or borrowed). The
intergenerational transfers from mid-age worker to their old parents act as a channel through which
parents have incentive to invest in quantity and quality of children.2
The mid-age agent’s earning at period t is determined by the amount of time allocated on working,
the human capital ht the agent has, and the wage rate wt.
mt = wtht(1− xt(τtλt + ν))
Production.The production side of the economy is given by an aggregate production function
Yt = F (Kt, ztHt)




Assuming capital depreciation rate is ζ at the end of every period, the dynamics of physical capital
2The incorporation of endogenous transfer from children to parents not only put forward a fundamentally reason
for rearing and educating children, but also drives a dynamic transition on fertility choices. See Appendix A for more
details.
3In this paper, gt specially refer to growth rate of productivity generated from institutional improvements and
economic reforms in China.
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accumulation is given by
Kt = Nt−1at−1 + (1− ζ)Kt−1.
And Ht is the aggregate stock of human capital used for producing goods, which is given by
Ht = htltNt = ht
(
1− xt(τtλt + ν)
)
Nt
4 Therefore, the production function at time t is specified by











By solving firm’s profit maximization problem, F (Kt, zthtltNt) − wthtltNt − RtKt by choosing Nt
and Kt, get














, per capita physical capital stock.
Market clear condition.The whole economy faces a market clear condition at every period.
Yt = (cm,t + at)Nt + co,tNt−1.
Human capital accumulation. The current per capita human capital in the economy is assumed
to be determined by last generation’s per capita human capital, per capita investment made by last
generation and the productivity to produce human capital, A :
ht+1 = Ahtτt
.
4ht is the effective per capita human capital used in producing output. lt = 1 − xt(τtλt + ν) is how much time
spent on working. Therefore, according to the definitions the marginal product of human capital is actually the wage
rate of per unit of human capital, which is wage per unit of time per unit of human capital.
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1.3.2 Optimal Decisions, balanced growth path and model dynamic
Mid-age agent maximizes life-time utility by choosing the number of children nt, the investment on
children’s education τt, the transfer to parents πt, the amount of capital to lend (or borrow) at. The
first order conditions with respect to nt, τt, at and πt yield

































Intergenerational transfer. Given the optimal choices of fertility, education investment and
saving, the decision on intergenerational transfer is the first order condition for πt , Eq.(1.3), and
resource constraint for old-age agent5,
πt =
η
η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
(mt − at)−
Rt




η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
(mt − at) +
η
η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
Rtat−1. (1.7)





From Eq.(1.4), co,t = ηcm,t. And cm,t = mt − at − πt. Combined the three equations, Eq.(1.6) is obtained. Then
plug Eq.(1.6) into Eq.(1.5) with taking siblings’ transfers as given, Eq.(1.7) is obtained.
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η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
Rt.



















η + nt(1− ρt)
Rt+1 (1.10)
The current decisions on the number of children and human capital investment on their descendants
affect people’s future consumption through the transfers from children. Also the quantity and
quality of child affect the total amount of transfer. Because each generation of mid-age agent cares
about parents’ consumptions, by Eq.(1.6), the transfer is predictable, therefore future returns on
investment on children’s quality are predictable as well. In this sense, parents consider children as











η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
wtAht−1
(













η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
−
ηnt−1(1− ρt−1)2




(η + nt−1(1− ρt−1))2
=
η2(1− ρt−1)
(η + nt−1(1− ρt−1))2
(mt − at)−
ηRtat−1(1− ρt−1)
(η + nt−1(1− ρt−1))2
=
η(1− ρt−1)
η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
( η
η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
(mt − at)−
Rtat−1




η + nt−1(1− ρt−1)
πt
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η + nt(1− ρt)
ηRt+1cm,t
(1.11)






η + nt(1− ρt)
(1.12)
The ratio of mid-age consumption for generation t + 1 over mid-age consumption for generation t
positively depends on gross return of physical capital at time t + 1 and negatively depends on the
fertility choice of generation t.
Fertility and human capital investment. By Eq.(1.1), the first order condition with respect to
nt is











Plug the Eqn.(8) and Eqn.(10) into it, get
−wtht(1− ρt)(τtρt + ν)
cm,t
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The decision on number of children born depend on equating the utility of having an additional
child to the net marginal cost of raising the child. LHS of Eq.(1.13) is the marginal benefit of having
additional child. The first term in RHS is the wage loss of having one more child; the second term
is actually the discount future transfer of the additional child.
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After rearrangement, it becomes




Human capital investment hinges on equating the marginal cost of educating children, that is the
first term in RHS, to the additional benefit from one more unit of human capital investment, that
is the second term. Eq.(1.4), Eq.(1.11), Eq.(1.13) and Eq.(2.1) govern the behavior of the four
endogenous variables in the whole system, and describe the transition process from initial period to
balanced growth path .
Balanced growth path. For simplicity, I assume a constant school efficiency λ, a constant pro-
ductivity A, and a zero young adult mortality rate. On balanced growth path nt = nss, τt = τss,
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determined by the following equations:
τss =
β(1− νnss)





− ((1− β)nss + η)δ




− δ(η + nss)




















Equation (1.15) is from the first order condition for τ , Eq.(1.2), and Eq.(1.16) is from the first
order condition for n, Eq.(1.1). The behavior of these two equations are depicted by the two
curves in Figure 1.4. The red solid curve represents the combination of n and τ that satisfies
Eq.(1.15). It implies how educational investment response to more childbirth. More children born
will reduce the resource available to educational investment on each of them. The black solid curve
describes Eq.(1.16), which shows how fertility choice response to higher education investment. Higher
education investment will cause higher human capital level, which will induce people to have fewer
children.
1.3.3 Model Dynamics and implications
In the theory, the difference in schooling efficiency, λ, would induce difference in human capital
accumulation across regions. A higher value of λ means less time efficiency in investing education,
indicating how much time cost parent pay out for one more year of schooling attained by children.
Higher the time cost for parents, less investment parents would make in education. To reach the
same level of schooling of children, parent has to spent less time on working, leading to a lower wage
income in his/her mid-age.
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Figure 1.5 depicts how state variables converges to balanced growth path over time with an illus-
trative calibration. As those figures show, (n,τ ,a,π) converge quickly. From these figures, a better
school efficiency cause a higher education investment, but slight change in fertility choices; a higher
cost is compensated with higher return, that is, higher amount of transfer can be expected from
each child; mid-age agents save fewer amount of income, since they have to reciprocate parents for
their given at a such expensive price. However, a higher education cost doesn’t induce agent to
make sizable change in fertility choice. The reason behind is that one more child means one more
times of total wage cost (eg. educational cost and rearing cost) and one more year of schooling only
means 0.05 more educational cost8. So, bigger λ would increases the wage foregone of having an
additional child, but it won’t increase a lot since the educational cost spent on each child is relatively
low. Although the decrease in marginal child’s human capital is significant (by the first subplot),
the decrease in future transfers is not significant (by the forth subplot). According to Eq.(1.13),
as λ increases, the first term in RHS increases a little and the second term decrease a little, which
gives the total change in RHS is not huge. Therefore, the disincentive to having one more child only
decrease slightly.
1.3.4 Basic model with one-child policy
One-child policy was introduced by Chinese government in 1979, and was enforced as a law in 1980.
Suppose that under this policy the maximum number of children each individual can have is n̄,
and n̄ varies at provincial level. If the most strict rule was undertaken, each individual have up to
0.5 child, so generally n̄ ∈ [0.5, 1). To capture the effect of birth control regulation, an additional
constraint nt ≤ n̄ is added into the middle-age agent’s utility-maximization problem described
already. However, population would shrink to zero when time goes to infinity, it is not realistic to
implement the policy forever. Therefore, the one-child policy is unsustainable in long run. Also,
considering this policy was abandoned on 2015, this model would become more realistic by making
the following assumption:
Assumption: The one-child policy is carried on over a certain time period [t′, t′ + T ] and is public
information for all agents.




Under the fertility constraint and the above assumption on the duration of birth control policy, two
cases are discussed below.





and π∗t is determined by first order conditions Eq.(1.2), Eq.(1.4), and Eq.(1.3) during the time period
[t′, t′ + T ].
Case 2. 0 < n∗t < n̄. Policy is not binding, the optimal solutions are exactly the same as the
no-policy scenario described before.
1.4 Calibration and Simulation
In this section, I outline the procedure to calibrate all model parameters. The numerical values of
those parameters for the whole country are contained in table 1.2 and table 1.3, together with brief
explanations. Below follows some motivation for how those parameters are chosen.
1. I assume that each period corresponds to 20 years, and the initial cohort entering labour market
is on 1950. Also assume that the new cohort entering labour market is ten years younger than
the last one9.
2. I set some parameters to commonly chosen values. The capital share of output, α, is set
to 0.33. Time preference, β, is set to 0.8179 for 20-year horizon, that is, 0.99 per annum.
Depreciation rate of physical capital, ζ, is set to 0.558 for 20-year horizon, that is, 0.04 per
annum. The time cost of rearing child, ν, is set to 0.125, which is consistent with Tamura and
Simon (2008).
3. School efficiency in initial period of 1950-1970 for the whole country is set to 0.7057. It is





Where yt is real GDP per worker, xt is from employment growth, kt is real physic capital
9I have middle-aged cohorts in 1950-1970, 1960-1980, 1970-1990, and so on. And I assume that at initial periods,
there is no old-age population. That means, mid-age agents at initial periods only care about number of childbirth
and their life time consumption.
16
stock, and τt is the ratio of expected years of schooling to 20 years. Then school efficiency in
1950-1970 can be obtained by the above equation using information from data.
To obtain school efficiency for later periods, assume that it converges linearly in 6th period
from initial value to the value for US. The calibrated school efficiency in different time periods
are contained in table 1.3. This assumption doesn’t affect comparisons of simulated results
of between policy scenario and non-policy scenario, because it is the same in both economic
scenarios and its effects can be canceled off under comparison.
School efficiency for US, λus, is set to 0.21, which is calibrated according to Eq.(1.15) with
nus = 1, τus = 0.7625, ν = 0.125, and β = 0.8179 for 20-year horizon. The values for τus
and nus are educational investment and fertility rate, respectively, on balanced growth path




τus(ηus + nus + βnus)
(1.19)
Since from Eq.(1.17) and Eq.(1.31), we have,
ηus + nus =
βR
yt+1/yt







Set yt+1/yt = 1.4859 for 20-year horizon, that is 1.02 per annum, and set R = 6.7274 for 20-
year horizon, that is 1.1 on an annual basis. Note that R is constructed by cost share of physical
capital times real physical capital stock, divided by real GDP for US during 1965-201410. Then
this setting produces λus = 0.21.
4. The productivity growth gt in 1950-1970 for China is obtained according to production function
with data on real GDP, real physical capital stock, expected years of schooling, and number
10Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data
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With national data during 1950-1990, initial gt for China is obtained.
Then let productivity converge linearly to one in 2050 − 2070. And then assume that zt in
initial period is normalized to one, therefore the national productivity can be obtained by
zt+1 = ztgt. For each time period, the corresponding productivity and productivity growth
used in simulation is contained in table 1.3. And figure 1.6 plot the productivity over time.
5. Assume that mid-age agents in 1970 − 1990,1980 − 2000, 1990 − 2010 and 2000 − 2020 face
fertility restriction. Data on fertility constraints for different cohorts of people at different time
are from Census data provided by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). Young-adult
mortality rate, ρ, during 1950 − 2010 are constructed from real data, and then assumed to
decrease to zero in 2050− 2070.11
6. Preference for number of children, δ, is set to 0.7529. Preference for old-age parents’ con-
sumption, η, is set to 2.9057. Productivity to produce human capital, A, is set to 1.9. In
previous discussion, I already assume that on balanced growth path annual gross growth rate
of productivity due to economic reform and institutional improvement, is one. Further, I as-
sume that on balanced growth path annual gross growth rate of GDP per worker is 1.02% for
China. That means yt+1/yt = 1.4859 for 20-year horizon. Then according to Eq.(1.17), we
have A = 1.9.
11Young-adult mortality, ρ, defined as the probability of dying before age 35. It is specified as the unconditional
probability of dying between the ages of 1 and 35, p̂1,35, plus the infant mortality rate, m , that is,
ρ = m+ p̂1,35.
This is very similar to the specification in Murphy, Tamura and Simon (2016) except that they use one third of infant
mortality rate instead. They use one third of infant mortality because it explicitly distinguishes the cost of child
death in infancy and a child death after the age of 1 with assumption that for infant deaths the woman has sufficient
childbearing years remaining to replace the lost child and that the level of human capital investment in the child is
much less than a child death after the age of 1 (Tamura and Simon (2016)). In this paper, the cost of rearing and
investing in lost child doesn’t go into the budget constraint, therefore the unconditional probability of dying before
age 35 is used to measure ρ for simplicity and convenience. See Appendix.B for more details about how to obtain
p̂1,35 and m .
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Now with all these parameters already got, (δ, η) can be determined by Eq.(1.15), Eq.(1.16),
and (nss, τss) on balanced growth path. I search for the two parameters (nss, τss) by “cali-
bration exercise”. And (nss, τss) are chosen according to two criterion: fitting actual data on
education investment as closely as possible and restricting (nss, τss) to reasonable ranges
12.
These exercise produces nss of 0.85 and τss of 0.7821 (15.6416 years of schooling over 20 years).
And it also simultaneously generates δ of 0.7529 and η of 2.9057.
I also calibrate model parameters and do simulation for provinces (Shanghai, Sichuan, Hunan, and
Gansu). Compared with the procedure to produce parameters and do simulation for the whole
country , there are several different criteria used to for provinces:
1. I use provincial level data to calibrate model parameters for corresponding provinces, while
I use national level data to produce the ones for the whole country. As a result, simulated
aggregate results are not the adding up of the provincial results. For instance, I use provincial
school efficiency in 1960− 1980 from table(1.1) for initial period.
2. Due to missing provincial level data in 1950, I assume that initial time period is 1960− 1980,
and new cohort is twenty years younger than the last one13.
3. Because fertility restriction is not binding for every province during policy periods, so the
provinces where one-child policy is not binding are assumed to have no fertility restriction.
For instances, I do not impose any fertility restriction in Shanghai in model simulation. For
other three poor provinces (Sichuan, Hunan, and Gansu), they face fertility restriction in
1980− 2020.
Except that, I follow the same procedure to produce model parameters and conduct simulations for
provinces. In the following part of this section, I discuss the simulation results as well as more detail
regarding to calibration and simulation.
School efficiency. The differences in time efficiency of schooling is an important cause of variations
in human capital accumulation across provinces. To recovery the school efficiency parameter for each
province, provincial data on employed labour, real GDP, real physical capital stock, expected years
of schooling are used according to Eq.(1.18). Data on total number of employed people are from
12The resulting (nss, τss) have to fall in reasonable ranges consistent with empirical evidences. For nss, it has to
be lower than 1, since developed Asian economy, such as Singapore, Japan, Hongkong, and Taiwan, has fertility rates
below 2 for decades. And in recent years, those area have expected years of schooling above 14.
13I have middle-aged cohorts in 1960-1980, 1980-2000, 2000-2020, and so on.
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census data provided by NBSC, and data on real capital stock are from Yanrui Wu (2009), and data
on real GDP are constructed with information on nominal GDP, real GDP growth, GDP deflator of
base year (see Appendix B and Appendix C for details). The national school efficiency are calibrated
by the same methodology with national level data14.
Due to the missing data on Tibet, Chongqing, and Hainan, 28 provinces’ school efficiency in 1960-
1980 and 1980-2000 are calculated and contained in table 1.1. School efficiency in different time
period has similar pattern: East and Northeast province tends to have smaller school efficiency
value, while for Middle or West province it tends to be larger. This pattern makes sense because
East and Northeast are more economically developed. But as table 1.1 and figure 1.9 show, it was
higher during 1980-2000 than that during 1960-1980 not only at provincial level, but also at national
level. One possible explanation behind is that the cost of having children in theory is assumed to only
incorporate educating cost and rearing cost, but other costs associated with the number of children
arise after introducing birth control. Those other costs associated with having “out-of-plan” child
,including huge amount of fines, risk of loosing job, run-away to avoid forced abortion. Moreover,
many births of children without permit went unreported or were hidden from authorities. Those
children, most of whom were undocumented, faced hardships in obtaining education. Unfortunately,
data on this kind of “hidden” children was not collected, and financial penalties imposed on family
who has “out-of-plan” children is varied by province and is not released by provincial governments.
Because of those data issue, school efficiencies are overestimated during 1980-2000. But, those data
issue are supposed to be common for all provinces, the cross sectional comparison between different
provinces during two different periods are meaningful.
Figure 1.7 depicts the combinations of the real regional gross domestic output per labour at year
2010 and the school efficiency during 1960-1980 for 28 provinces. East provinces and northeast
provinces are concentrated in left top area, middle provinces are clustered in the middle part, and
west provinces are concentrated in the right bottom area except for Inner Mongolia. And it indicates
that provinces with a better school efficiency associates with a higher real GDP per labour. The
relationship between school efficiency during 1960-1980 and growth rate of regional real GDP per
labour from 1980 to 2010 is described in figure 1.8. It’s hard to tell the true relationship between
school efficiency and growth rate of real GDP per labour. After 1979, a series of dramatic economic
14National level data on real GDP and real physical capital stock are from FRED. National level data on employed
labour are from NBSC.
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reforms and institutional changes varies by provinces. For example, the reform and opening-up
policy favored coastal regions from the beginning of the reform. Probably because of this reason,
the link between school efficiencies and GDP growth rates get weaken.
Fertility, human capital accumulation, and GDP. In this part, the effect of birth control
policy is evaluated at national level. I simulate the behavior of two middle-aged cohorts which
start at 1950 and 1960 respectively and their offspring. Also, suppose that for cohort of 1950, their
offspring would face fertility constraint in 1970−1990 and 1990−2010, and for cohort of 1960, their
offspring would face fertility constraint in 1980 − 2000 and 2000 − 2020. Table 1.2 and table 1.3
contains all parameters used in simulation.
In table 1.4 I use OLS and log-log regressions of data on simulation results. We run the following
regressions:
yt = α+ βxt
ln(yt) = α+ βln(xt)
In these two regressions, yt is the data on fertility rate or expected years of schooling, and xt is
the simulation results on fertility rate or expected years of schooling. As table 1.4 shows, we have
positive and 0.1% statistically significant β’s, and all R̄2’s are more than 55%. I find that the
evidence are broadly supportive.
As figure 1.10 shows, fertility declines for both policy scenario and non-policy scenario from the start,
and it decreases more in the policy scenario. But after the policy ends, fertility for both scenarios
gradually converge to 1.7 at balanced growth path. As figure 1.11 shows, an impressive impact
of this policy on educational investment appears in 1980-2010, during which simulated expected
years of schooling increase from 6.61 to 11.01 in policy scenario while those rise from 5.68 to 6.89
in no-policy scenario. And the simulated education investment in policy scenario are very close to
actual data. But with the policy coming to an end, an undershoot of education investment occurs in
transitional process because people would like to have more children and fertility will be higher than
previous three decades. From figure 1.11, the policy encourages more educational investment and
increase expected years of schooling by 2.91 years on average during policy periods, but induces lower
investment after it ends, which is even slightly lower than that in no-policy scenario. Over the entire
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periods, the policy causes a faster physical capital human capital accumulation, as table 1.5 shows15.
which leads to higher real GDP per worker after 2010, as figure 1.12 depicts. In 1980 − 2060, the
model predicts an annual gain of moderate 5.01% in real GDP per worker induced by the policy.
That means each worker produces 5.01% more real GDP on average in policy scenario during these
periods.
Population and Demographic transition. Figure 1.13 depicts total population growths for
policy scenario and non-policy scenario. Total population growths under the two scenario have the
similar pattern since 1950: population sustainably grows until around 2010, and then continue to
shrink since then. Compared with non-policy scenario, the annual population growth rate is 1.23%
points lower on average during policy period, and it is 0.85% points lower on average in 2020−2080.
Considered that the simulated annual growth rate of population for non-policy scenario during
1980−2020 is 1.28%, I conclude that the policy largely decrease the population growth rate in those
periods.
Figure 1.14 represents the simulated results in some aspects of demographic change generated in
the two scenarios. As fertility rate declines, dependent children decreases and family size shrinks in
both scenarios. The one-child policy reinforces those consequences. In policy scenario, the share of
non-productive dependents rises from 55% to above 72%, and the share of mid-age workers declines
from 45% to 28% from 1990 to 2030, while in non-policy scenario, the corresponding shares are from
63% to 66% and from 37% to 34%. From those subfigures in figure 1.14, the effective birth control
creates three generations facing less non-productive dependents and subsequent several generations
troubled with larger proportions of old-age dependents, compared with no-policy scenario. It imposes
large shift of population age structure on demographic transitional process from high to low fertility
society.
It seems that the situation future generations will meet is not so terrible as many people think. The
surge in the proportion of old-age dependent accompanies with low proportion of young dependent
approaching toward balanced growth path gradually from below. The patterns on old-age dependent
and young dependent can be observed in bottom subplots in figure 1.14. The peak in the proportion
of non-productive dependents comes in around 2030, during which fertility constraint induce about
15Table 1.5 shows the per worker physical capital and human capital accumulation for both economic scenarios.
The human capital accumulation rates are less than one in the early periods for both economic scenarios. And the
growth rates of physical capital and human capital are counterfactual. They are much to fast for physical capital and
too small for human capital. This is because of large growth rates of TFP during these times.
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17.8% points more share of old-dependent and about 5.92% points less share of mid-age worker,
compared to situation without fertility constraint. Fortunately, the peak is alleviated by smaller
ratio of children born. However, the model may underestimate the proportion of old-age dependents.
Since 1970, the life expectancy has largely increased as population health get improved. This feature
is not incorporated into model in which I assume that any generation can only live up to 60 years.
Therefore, in a realistic sense the influence of larger proportion of old-age dependents would be
longer and larger than the prediction of the theory.
Welfare Analysis. In this part, I turn to the effect of one-child policy on the welfare of the whole
society. Given the calibrated model parameters (β, η, δ, ζ, α) and optimal choices on fertility, {nt},
educational investment, {τt}, transfer, {πt}, and saving, {at}, at any point in time I can construct
maximal utility and optimal mid-age consumption of an agent living in policy regime at each time,
that is, V̂policy and Cm(V̂policy, n̂policy, âpolicy, π̂policy). As well, for an agent living in non-policy
regime, I can construct her maximal utility and optimal mid-age consumption at each time, denoted









To measure the the change in welfare due to one-child policy, we construct two kinds of indexes.
The first one is the ratio of utility of those living in policy regime to the utility of those living in




The second one is the ratio of mid-age consumption that is required to make those living in policy
regime as well as those living in non-policy regime to mid-age consumption of those living in policy
regime at each time. That is,
Cm(V
∗
nonpolicy, n̂policy, âpolicy, π̂policy)/Cm(V̂policy, n̂policy, âpolicy, π̂policy)
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Table (1.6) records welfare loss and welfare gains measured by different indexes. The first column is
the weighted average utility of those (including mid-age and old-age agents) living in policy regime
16V ∗nonpolicy denotes the maximal utility for non-policy scenario, V̂policy denotes the maximal utility for policy
scenario, and n̂policy , âpolicy , π̂policy are optimal choices on fertility, saving and transfer of those living in policy
regime.
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divided by the weighted average utility of those living in non-policy regime at each time17. The
second column is the ratio of mid-age consumption required to make the weighted average utility
of those living in policy regime at the same level of the weighted average utility of those living in
non-policy regime at each time. The third column is the utility of a mid-age agent living in policy
regime divided by the utility of a mid-age agent living in non-policy regime at each time. The forth
column is the ratio of mid-age consumption required to make the mid-age agent in policy scenario
as well as the one in non-policy scenario over the mid-age consumption in policy scenario. The fifth
column is the ratio of utility of an old-age agent in policy scenario over that in non-policy scenario
for each time. In this paper, I assume that there is no old-age population at initial periods. That is
to say, there is no old-age consumption in 1950− 1970 and 1960− 1980.
As the first and second column in the table shows, the whole society experiences welfare loss at
early periods since the beginning of the policy. At each time the average utility the whole society
can achieve in policy scenario is sustainably lower than that in non-policy scenario until decades
after the policy ended. That is mainly because the policy reduces the mid-age population, increases
the shares of old-age dependents. The utility of old-age agent become more important because they
account for higher share of population. At the same time, in non-policy regime, society is more
weighted towards mid-age agent. Since the policy enacted, welfare costs of society are rising until
around 2040, and the costs range from 1.03 to 113, 965 times of mid-age consumption. After that,
welfare costs are declining. As previously discussed, the policy promotes creation of human capital
so that faster human capital accumulation help accelerate GDP per workers in long run. Therefore,
in later periods when society in policy scenario accumulates higher enough human capital per worker
and physical capital per worker, welfare of society eventually surpass that in non-policy scenario.
Also, from the rest three columns in the table, I found that an agent living in policy regime has
lower utility in mid-age but higher utility in old-age during 1980− 2000. At these time, the welfare
loss for a mid-age agent range from 1.04 to 1.11 times of mid-age consumption. But after 2000, the
utility of an agent in mid-age in policy regime begins to reach and surpass that in non-policy regime
because GDP per worker and human capital stock per worker get higher enough. While the utility
of an old-age agent in policy regime is sustainable higher because they can collect higher return from
17The weighted average utility of society at each time is in policy regime calculated by the following:
Ûpolicy,t =
mid-age populationt
mid-age and old-age populationt
ûmid-age,t +
old-age populationt
mid-age and old-age populationt
ûold-age,t
Then weighted average utilities of society in non-policy regime at different times are calculated in the same way.
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saving and higher return from investing in children. Conclusively, the first generations facing the
fertility restriction get worse in mid-age, but get better in old-age; one-child policy improve welfare
of society in the later periods at the cost of welfare loss of society in the early periods18.
Economic disparity. Rapid fertility decline is found to make a quantitatively relevant contribution
to reducing the incidence and severity of poverty. Empirical evidence implies that fertility in most
east and northeast provinces starts to decline from early 1960s and is close to two in 1980. For
example, Shanghai has fertility rate of below one even on 1980.This suggests that the policy is not
binding in Shanghai since the beginning. Fertility in East and Northeast Provinces decline since early
1960s, while in middle and west provinces it began to decrease one decade later, as figure 1.1 shows.
And after 2000, the policy is not binding for most east and northeast provinces. table 1.8 records
the fertility targets of the policy and actual fertility rates for 28 provinces in 2006. It indicates that
in 2006, fertility targets of the policy are almost irrelevant in east and northeast provinces except for
Heibei, Jiangsu, Shandong and Guangdong, and are still binding in all middle and west provinces
except for Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia.
Now I turn to the comparison in simulated GDP per worker of between Shanghai(the richest province
in China) and three poor provinces (Sichuan, Hunan, Gansu) from the West and Middle. These
provinces are selected because they are bounded by the policy before and now, and they have rela-
tively less population of minorities, which indicates that the policy in these provinces is more strict
than in minority dominant provinces. In this part, I simulate the behavior of cohort of 1960 and
their offspring for selected provinces. Preference parameters (η, β) for Shanghai are calibrated to
fit actual fertility rates and expected years of schooling. But those parameters for the provinces
from West and Middle are calibrated to fit actual expected years of schooling and fertility rate of
around 1.7 on balanced growth path19. This is because according to fertility data and policy target
information from table 1.8 and figure 1.1, the policy is not binding for Shanghai20. However, the
three provinces from West and Middle are still under fertility restrictions during policy periods.
18And for the first generations facing the fertility restriction, they get worse in mid-age, but get better in old-age,
and their life time utility still get improved by the policy. This is reasonable because agent who makes decisions in
mid-age agent and receive transfer in old-age can not choose the exact amount of transfer to maximize their utility.
And also because the competitive equilibrium solutions of this general equilibrium overlapping generation model is
not Pareto optimal.
19Fertility rate of 1.7 is the fertility rate on balanced growth path for the whole China in previous calibration and
simulation part
20In 1980, Shanghai’s total fertility rate was already below than 1. For some years in 1980s, total fertility rate in
Shanghai is slightly higher than 1. Considered the exceptions allowed by the policy, we can assume that the policy is
not binding in Shanghai.
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Therefore, fertility constraints are enforced in 1980 − 2020 for the three poor provinces. The pref-
erence parameter values are given in table 1.7. And the rest other parameter values are chosen by
exactly the same methodology described in the beginning of the section.
Figure 1.15 plots the ratios of simulated GDP per worker for selected poor provinces to that of
Shanghai. These solid lines represent simulated results in policy scenario, while the dash lines
represent simulated results in non-policy scenario. The simulated results predict an alleviation in
economic inequality between the richest province, Shanghai, and those poor provinces after 1990.
And its biggest influence is predicted on the next generation after the policy expires, that is, after
2010. This prediction suggests that this policy delivers a smaller gap in income between rich and
poor provinces.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied a tractable dynamical general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations. This model is capable of capturing the Chinese social norms that adult children offer
financial support to their parents. This feature provides incentive for mid-age workers to invest in
their children’s quality and quantity. This simple model yields semi-closed solutions that reveal the
quantity-quality trade-off in children: parents are encouraged to increase their offspring’s education
to compensate for the reduction in the number of children. Therefore, when fertility constraint
is enforced, a distinct rise in educational investment emerges. And more strictly the constraint
is imposed, more educational investment is increased. Our counterfactual work presents that the
exogenous fertility restrictions imposed by one-child policy have lead to a surge in human capital
investment, further lead to a higher growth rate of GDP per worker when the more-educated gen-
erations grow up and enter labor market. The model predicts an annual gain of moderate 5.01% in
real GDP per worker during 2020− 2080.
This paper also demonstrates that the policy obviously decrease population growth by 1.23% points
on average in 1980− 2020, and by 0.85% points on average for later periods. It also generates large
shifts in demographic transitional process. Predictions imply that 19.47% points more share of old-
dependents and 6.47% points less share of mid-age workers caused by the policy when the peak of
non-productive dependent proportion arrives in 2030. Moreover, the model probably underestimates
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the severity of this social problem, because the increased life expectancy is not involved in the theory.
I expect a greater impact of the policy on heavy social burdens. Beyond that, this paper also predict
welfare changes due to one-child policy. It improves welfare of society at the later periods at the
cost of welfare loss at the early periods.
In this paper, educational cost acts as a exogenous sources of income imbalance across regions in
the theoretical framework. Large educational cost suppress the increase in educational investment,
leading to a slow human capital accumulation and then a slow income growth. Our calibration
work shows that the difference in educational cost between rich and poor provinces doesn’t narrow
down over time, even after economic reforms launched. But the one-child policy provided a natural
experiment linking fertility, educational investment, income growth across regions. It delivered larger
incentive for poor provinces make more educational investment to attain a temporal higher income
growth under its influence.
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1.7 Appendix A: Theory
A.1 Model Comparison Consider a standard overlapping generation model where mid-age agent
do not give transfer to their old-age parents, but they still make decisions on quality and quantity
of their children. The utility function is rewrote as:
Ut = lncm,t + δlnxt + ηlnht+1 + βlnco,t+1.
Where ht+1 denotes per capita human capital of next generation, and xt = nt(1 − ρt). And the
budget constraints are rewrote as:
cm,t + at = mt,
co,t+1 = Rt+1at,
1 = lt + xt(τtλt + ν).
Suppose other assumptions do not change. Mid-age agent maximizes life-time utility by choosing
the number of children nt, the investment on children’s education τt, the amount of capital to lend
(or borrow) at. The first order conditions with respect to nt, τt and at yield
δ
nt















Combine Eq.(1.23) and Eq.(1.24), we get,
1 =
δ(mt − at)













Plug it into Eq.(1.26), we get
nt =
δ − η
ν(1− ρt)(1 + β)
lt. (1.27)





From Eq.(1.27) and Eq.(1.28),
nt =
δ − η
(1 + β + δ)ν
.
So the model result shows that fertility nt is constant over time. This simple set-up without endoge-
nous transfer can not drive dynamic transition of nt.
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. As time t goes to infinity, the optimal






π,t converges respectively to nss, τss, sa,ss and sπ,ss for constant λ, zero
young adult mortality rate, and as well Rt = R for all t.










Combined it with market clear condition, we get
Rt
at−1Nt−1 + (1− ζ)Kt−1
Nt













After arrangement, it becomes
Rt =
αmtnt−1



















1− nt+1(λτt+1 + ν)
1− nt(λτt + ν)
.








(1− α)sa,ss + (1− ζ)sk,ss
. (1.30)





































































(1− sa,t+1 − sπ,t+1)mt+1


























Arrange Eq.(2.1) and get,





























λ(η + nss + βnss)
. (1.32)
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= nt(τtλt + ν)
wtht
(1− sa,t − sπ,t)mt
− ntsπ,t+1mt+1
Rt+1(1− sa,t − sπ,t)mt
=
nt(τtλt + ν)
(1− sa,t − sπ,t)(1− nt(τtλt + ν))
− ntsπ,t+1mt+1
Rt+1(1− sa,t − sπ,t)mt
.
On balanced growth path,,
δ =
nss(τssλ+ ν)
(1− sa,ss − sπ,ss)(1− nss(τssλ+ ν))
− Agnssτsssπ,ss
R(1− sa,ss − sπ,ss)
.
That is,
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βη − β(η + nss)sπ,ss






(1− α)(η + nss)Agτss
=
βη − β(η + nss)sπ,ss















sa,ss + sπ,ss =
βη
βη + η + nss
+
(1− β)nss + η
βη + η + nss
sπ,ss.
1− sπ,ss − sa,ss =
η + nss
βη + η + nss
− (1− β)nss + η
βη + η + nss
sπ,ss. (1.35)




− ((1− β)nss + η)δ




− δ(η + nss)
















Conclusively, nss and τss are determined by Eq.(1.36) and Eq.(1.32).
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1.8 Appendix B: Data Construction
The literature has mainly constructed those data sets: the expected years of schooling, the real
regional GDP, and the mortality rates.
Expected years of schooling. Expected years of schooling data consists of provincial annual ob-
servations covering the period from 1949 to 2010. Those data are constructed from primary school
enrollment rates, secondary school enrollment rates and higher education enrollment rates, accord-
ing to this formula: for a child of age 7 at year t, expected years of schooling he will attain is the
sum of primary school enrollment rates from year t to t+ 5, secondary school enrollment rates from
year t + 6 to t + 11 and higher education enrollment rates from year t + 12 to t + 16. Since the
enrollment rates data only spans the time period of 1949-2010, for children born after year 1985 the
forward higher education enrollment rates are not available. Following the procedure in Murphy,
Simon and Tamura (2008), I use the linear projections of three enrollment rates on time trend, of
which primary school enrollment rates are truncated by 1 if projected values are above 1.
The annual primary school enrollment rates, used to constructed expected years of schooling, start
in 1949 and end in 2010, covering 30 provinces, obtained from published book ”China’s Provincial
Statistics: 1949-1982” and from China Statistic Yearbooks. The primary school ages in China are
from 7 to 12. For annual enrollment rates for secondary school and higher education, the school
ages are from 13 to 18 and from 19 to 23, respectively. The data are constructed for each province
i, by those formula:
enrolment rates for secondary schooli,t =
the number of students in secondary schooli,t
population of ages 13-18i,t
.
enrolment rates for higher educationi,t =
the number of students in higher education instituioni,t
population of ages 19-23i,t
.
Where the population distribution since 1982 are calculated from the raw data obtained from each
provinces’ statistic yearbooks, the population of ages 13-18 for year t before 1982 are estimated by
the population of ages 7-12 for year t−1, and the population of ages 19-23 for year t before 1982 are
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estimated by the sum of newborns 19-23 years ago from that year with the assumption that these
groups of people do not move across provinces since born.
Real regional GDP. Since National Bureau of Statistics of China only reports nominal GDP levels
and real GDP growth, but not real GDP levels, the real GDP for each provinces are constructed with
information on nominal GDP, real GDP growth. GDP deflator of the base year (1953) is normalized
to one. Year-over-year real growth rates for each province are used to construct the growth rate of
each provinces deflator.
Infant mortality. Infant mortality at provincial level are from China Center for Human Capital
and Labor Market Research (CHLR) in 1982, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010. For year prior
to 1982, Provincial infant mortality rates are obtained by the product of proportions of national
infant mortality rate in 1982 and national infant mortality rates at the year. Table 1.11 represents
the result of pooled regression of log of infant survival rates at provincial level against log of infant
survival rates at national level. Observations are taken in 1982, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
covering 31 provinces. The regression results show that 25% of variations in provincial level can be
explained by the variations in national level.
Young mortality. National young mortality, deaths before age 35, are obtained from CHLR during
1988-1990, 1994-2007, 2010 on annual basis. Let p1,35 denoted the probability of dying before 35
conditional on surviving the infant period, and m denotes the probability of dying in infant period.
Table 1.9 presents the results of regressions of log of young survival rates on log of infant survival
rates, with/out time effect. The first column shows that without time effect, the variations of infant
survival rates can explain 79% of young survival rates, the second column indicates that controlled
by year, the result get improved with R̄2 of 90%, and the final column indicates that controlled by
time and time-squared, 89% of variations of young survival rates can be explained by infant survival
rates. Therefore, young mortality rate prior to 1988, p1,35, is projected by regression function of
year and infant mortality, m. And the unconditional probabilities of dying between the ages of 1
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and 35, p̂1,35, are constructed by,
p̂1,35 = p1,35 ∗ (1−m).
And the conditional and unconditional probabilities of dying between the ages of 1 and 35 for each
provinces are constructed by the similar procedure. Specifically, p1,35 are constructed by the same
regression function with same coefficients from national data, and p̂1,35 are still obtained by the
equation mentioned above.
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1.9 Appendix C: Data Sources
The data are constructed from a variety of sources, including:
1. Ansley J. Coale and Chen Sheng Li, “Basic data on fertility in the provinces of China, 1940-82”.
Homolulu, HI: East-West Center, Papers of the East-West Population Institute, no.104.
2. Hsueh, Tien-tung, Qiang Li and Shucheng Liu, “China’s Provincial Statistics, 1949-1989”.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
3. China Statistical Yearbooks, various issues.
4. China Human Capital Measurement and Human Capital Index Project, China Center for
Human Capital and Labor Market Research (CHLR).
5. “China Compendium of Statistics: 1949-2008”. China Statistics Press.
Nominal output
1949-2008, annual nominal output from “China Compendium of Statistics: 1949-2008”.
2009-2010, annual nominal output from China Statistical Yearbooks (2010 and 2011).
Number of workers
1949-2008, number of workers from “China Compendium of Statistics: 1949-2008”.
2009-2010, number of workers from China Statistical Yearbooks (2010 and 2011).
Real physical capital stock.
1953-2005, real physical capital stock in provincial level from Yanrui Wu (2009), which is in 1953
price.
Fertility rates
1945-1981, annual total fertility rates in provincial level from “Basic data on fertility in the provinces
of China, 1940-82”.
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1982-2010, total fertility rates in provincial level on 1982, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 from
China Statistical Yearbooks (1990-2011).
1950-1980, total fertility rates in national level from 2012 Revision of World Population Prospects.
1982-2010, total fertility rates in national level on 1982, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 from
China Statistical Yearbooks (1990-2011).
Mortality rates
1988-1990, 1994-2007, 2010, annual data for age-specific mortality at national level are from CHLR.
1950-1990, infant mortality at national level are from United Nations Population Division, and ob-
servations are taken every five year.
1982, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, infant mortality at provincial level are from CHLR.
Primary school enrollment rates
1949-1981, primary school enrollment rates from “China’s Provincial Statistics, 1949-1989”.
1982-2010, primary school enrollment rates form China Statistical Yearbooks (1990-2011).
Secondary school enrollment rates and higher education enrollment rates
1949-2008, number of students in school for each provinces from “China Compendium of Statistics:
1949-2008”,and population in school ages for each provinces constructed from raw data in “China’s
Provincial Statistics, 1949-1989” and China Human Capital Measurement and Human Capital Index
Project.
2009-2010, number of students in school for each provinces from China Statistical Yearbooks (2010-
2011), and population in school ages for each provinces from China Human Capital Measurement
and Human Capital Index Project.
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1.10 Appendix D: Figures
Figure 1.1: Fertility rates for 28 provinces from 1945-2010.
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Figure 1.2: Expected years of schooling for 30 provinces from 1949-2010.
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Figure 1.3: Ratios of real GDP per Worker for 28 provinces over that of Shanghai from 1952-2010.
44
Figure 1.4: Human capital and fertility choices on balanced growth path using illustrative calibration.
Note: α = 0.333, β = 0.998 per annum, ζ = 0.04, δ = 1.05, η = 0.85, λ = 0.46, Ag = 3.5,
ν = 0.125.
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Figure 1.5: State variables on balanced growth path using illustrative calibration.
Note: α = 0.333, β = 0.998 per annum, ζ = 0.04, δ = 1.05, η = 0.85, Ag = 3.5, ν = 0.125.
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Figure 1.6: National productivity used in simulation.
47
Figure 1.7: Real GDP of region per worker and school efficiency across 28 provinces in 2010.
Note: black ones represent east and northeast provinces, while red ones represent middle and west
provinces.
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Figure 1.8: Growth rate of real GDP and school efficiency across 28 provinces during time period of
1980-2010.
Note: black ones represent east provinces, red ones represent west provinces, blue ones represent
middle provinces, and purple ones represent northeast provinces.
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Figure 1.9: School efficiency for 28 Provinces.
Note: black line is a 45 degree line.
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Figure 1.10: Number of childbirths per household.
Note: blue line represents simulated results in non-policy scenario, red line represents simulated
results in policy scenario, black line represents actual data.
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Figure 1.11: Educational investment, unit: year.
Note: blue line represents simulated results in non-policy scenario, red line represents simulated
results in policy scenario, black line represents actual data.
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Figure 1.12: Log of GDP per worker.
Note: blue line represents simulated results in non-policy scenario, red line represents simulated
results in policy scenario.
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Figure 1.13: Log of total population.
Note: blue line represents simulated results in non-policy scenario, red line represents simulated
results in policy scenario.
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Figure 1.14: Demographic transition.
Note: blue line represents simulated results in non-policy scenario, red line represents simulated
results in policy scenario.Clockwise from top left subfigure: non-productive dependent ratio; mid-
age population ratio; young-age population ratio; old-age population ratio.
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Figure 1.15: Ratios of simulated GDP per worker of poor provinces over that of Shanghai.
Preference parameters for each provinces (Shanghai, Sichuan, Hunan, Gansu) are contained in
Table 1.7. Solid lines represent simulated results in policy scenario, and dash lines represents
simulated results in non-policy scenario.
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1.11 Appendix E: Tables
































Table 1.2: Calibration of parameter values and initial conditions for the whole country.
parameter value description detail
α 0.333 cost share of capital commonly used
β 0.8179 time preference commonly used
η 2.9057 preference for old parent’s consumption by Eq.(1.15) and Eq.(1.16)
δ 0.7529 preference for number of children by Eq.(1.15) and Eq.(1.16)
ν 0.125 rearing cost of children Tamura and Simon(2008)
ζ 0.558 commonly used
A 1.9 productivity to produce human capital Eqn.(1.17) using τss = 0.7821
λ 0.21 school efficiency on BGP by Eqn.(1.15)
nss 0.85 fertility rate on BGP
τss 0.7821 educational investment on BGP
λ50,0 0.7057 initial school efficiency for cohort 1950 by Eqn.(1.18), data in 1950-1970
n50,0 3 number of children per person during 1950-1970 fertility rate in 1950-1970
n60,0 2.42 number of children per person in 1960-1980 fertility rate in 1960-1980
n̄50,1 2 fertility constraint in 1970-1990 fertility rate in 1990-2010
n̄60,1 0.8 fertility constraint in 1980-2000 fertility rate in 1980-2000
n̄50,2 0.6 fertility constraint in 1990-2010 fertility rate in 1990-2010
n̄60,2 0.54 fertility constraint in 2000-2020 fertility rate in 2000-2010
k50,0 1725 initial physical capital per worker for cohort of 1950 from FRED, unit:2005 US dollar
k60,0 2418 initial physical capital per worker for cohort of 1960 from FRED, unit:2005 US dollar
y50,0 20306 initial GDP per worker in 1950-1970 from FRED, unit:2005 US dollar
y60,0 26057 initial GDP per worker in 1960-1980 from FRED, unit:2005 US dollar
Note: Table reports the values of model parameters and initial conditions for 20-period horizon. We set β
to 0.8179 on a 20-year basis, that is, 0.99 on an annual basis. ζ is 0.558 on a 20-year basis, that is, 0.04 on
an annual basis. Initial values for physical capital per worker and GDP per worker are sum of corresponding
data in 20 years.
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Table 1.3: School efficiency and TFP for the whole country.
Time School Efficiency Productivty Productivty Growth(20-year horizon)
1950-1970 0.7057 1 4.2695
1960-1980 0.6561 2.0707 4.0667
1970-1990 0.6066 4.2695 3.705
1980-2000 0.5570 8.4208 3.3433
1990-2010 0.5974 15.8186 2.9814
2000-2020 0.4579 28.1533 2.6194
2010-2030 0.4083 47.1622 2.2571
2020-2040 0.3587 73.7455 1.8945
2030-2050 0.3091 106.4535 1.5313
2040-2060 0.2596 139.7144 1.1667
After 2050 0.2100 163.0088 1
Note: school efficiency in 1950-1970 is calibrated from data according to Eq.(1.15). School
efficiencies after 2050 are set to that for US. TFP in 1950-1970 are normalized to one.
Productivity growth is for 20-year horizon. For instance, productivity growth in 1950−1970
is the ratio of productivity in 1970− 1990 to productivity in 1950− 1970.
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Table 1.4: Pooled regression of data on model solutions: fertility and expected years of schooling.
τdata ndata lnτdata lnndata
τmodel 0.807 ∗∗∗ - - -
(.0650)
nmodel - 2.220∗∗∗ - -
(0.2206)
lnτmodel - - 0.691∗∗∗ -
(0.0558)
lnnmodel - - - 1.428∗∗∗
(0.1129)
constant 3.150∗∗∗ -1.139∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.596) (.3387) (0.1223) ( 0.0499)
N 61 77 61 77
R̄2 0.7185 0.5690 0.7173 0.6765
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The row marked by p reports the results of the test that constant term is zero and coefficient
of explanatory variable is one.
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Table 1.5: Per worker physical capital and human capital accumulation.
Time kt,non−policy kt,policy ht,non−policy ht,policy
1950-1970 0.3284 0.3284 0.5193 0.5193
1960-1980 0.3467 0.3467 0.7410 0.7410
1970-1990 8.8925 10.2823 0.5395 0.6287
1980-2000 13.3534 18.8926 0.5723 0.8228
1990-2010 3.0309 4.8279 0.5977 0.9719
2000-2020 3.4510 5.3752 0.6548 1.0452
2010-2030 1.5425 1.4458 0.7431 0.7028
2020-2040 2.1412 1.9704 0.8031 0.7430
2030-2050 1.7294 1.6921 0.9079 0.8789
2040-2060 1.6952 1.6551 1.0427 1.0041
2050-2070 1.7036 1.6934 1.2177 1.1977
2060-2080 1.3799 1.3736 1.5167 1.4903
after 2070 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486
Note: The column marked by kt,non−policy reports the growth rates of physical capital per
worker, that is gkt,non−policy = kt+1/kt in non-policy regime. The column marked by kt,policy
reports the growth rates of physical capital per worker, that is gkt,policy = kt+1/kt in policy
regime. The column marked by ht,non−policy reports the growth rates of human capital
per worker, that is ght,non−policy = Aτt in non-policy regime.The column marked by ht,policy
reports the growth rates of human capital per worker, that is ght,policy = Aτt in policy regime.
The last row reports the values all variables converge to.
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1950-1970 1 1 1 1 -
1960-1980 1 1 1 1 -
1970-1990 0.9993 1.0288 0.9992 1.0353 1.0015
1980-2000 0.9981 1.09384 0.9977 1.1099 1.0014
1990-2010 0.9601 8.4391 1.0013 0.9446 1.0028
2000-2020 0.9045 462.81 1.0067 0.7202 1.0092
2010-2030 0.8540 27048 1.0213 0.3704 1.0153
2020-2040 0.8305 113965 1.0274 0.2429 1.0241
2030-2050 0.9554 13.481 1.0304 0.2287 1.0305
2040-2060 0.9452 37.6535 1.0374 0.1352 1.0313
2050-2070 0.9948 1.0892 1.0345 0.1749 1.0384
2060-2080 0.9962 0.9441 1.0426 0.0984 1.0345
2070-2090 1.1063 0.2792 1.0362 0.1519 1.0425
2080-2100 1.0214 0.1705 1.0445 0.0835 1.0358
Note: the first column records the ratio of the weighted average utility of society under non-policy
scenario to that under policy scenario at each time; the second column records the ratio of the mid-age
consumption that is required to make the weighted average utility of society in policy regime at the same
level of that in non-policy regime to the mid-age consumption in the policy regime at each time; the third
column records the ratio of utility of an agent in mid-age in policy scenario to that in non-policy scenario;
the forth column records the mid-age consumption that is required to make the mid-age agent in policy
regime at the same level of utility of the one in non-policy regime, divided by the mid-age consumption
of the agent in policy regime; the fifth column records the ratio of utility of an old-age agent in policy
regime to that in non-policy regime.
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Note: δ is the preference for number of childbirth, and η is the preference for old parent’s con-
sumption.
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Table 1.8: Policy targets and actual fertility rates for 28 provinces in 2006.
Province Policy target Actual rate Binding
Beijing 1.01 0.795 No
Tianjin 1.23 1.073 No
Heibei 1.391 1.702 Yes
Shanxi 1.36 1.408 Yes
Inner Mongolia 1.309 1.149 No
Liaoning 1.419 1.028 No
Jilin 1.426 1.1 No
Heilongjiang 1.08 1.045 No
Shanghai 1.173 0.801 No
Jiangsu 1.21 1.351 Yes
Zhejiang 1.423 1.345 No
Anhui 1.416 1.642 Yes
Fujian 1.438 1.330 No
Jiangxi 1.393 1.802 Yes
Shandong 1.389 1.532 Yes
Henan 1.402 1.934 Yes
Hubei 1.427 1.226 Yes
Hunan 1.437 1.53 Yes
Guangdong 1.369 1.451 Yes
Guangxi 1.432 1.786 Yes
Sichuan 1.117 1.561 Yes
Guizhou 1.59 1.962 Yes
Yunan 1.323 1.701 Yes
Shaanxi 1.338 1.28 No
Gansu 1.454 1.757 Yes
Qinghai 1.384 1.877 Yes
Ningxia 1.3 1.838 Yes
Xinjiang 1.461 1.63 Yes
Source: China Economic Yearbook 2013.
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Table 1.9: Log of survival rates between the ages of 1 and 35
Variable ln(1-p1,35) ln(1-p1,35) ln(1-p1,35)
ln(1-m) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
time No Yes Yes
timesq No No Yes
R̄2 0.79 0.90 0.89
Observations 18 18 18
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: Regression of log of survival rates by age group.
Variable ln(1-p1,5) ln(1-p5,10) ln(1-p10,15) ln(1-p15,20) ln(1-p20,25) ln(1-p25,30) ln(1-p30,35)
ln(1-m) 0.050∗∗∗ – – – – – –
ln(1-p1,5) – 0.204
∗∗∗ – – – – –
ln(1-p5,10) – – 0.652
∗∗∗ – – – –
ln(1-p10,15) – – – 1.086
∗∗ – – –
ln(1-p15,20) – – – – 0.923
∗∗∗ – –
ln(1-p20,25) – – – – – 0.794
∗∗∗ –
ln(1-p25,30) – – – – – – 0.870
∗∗∗
R̄2 0.62 0.77 0.59 0.37 0.60 0.68 0.86
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Evidence from School
Efficiency
2.1 Introduction
The negative correlation between quality and quantity of children per family has been widely dis-
cussed by economic literature. Becker and Lewis (1973) put forward a theory that sheds a deep
insight on understanding on the trade-off relationship between number of children born per family
and quality of these children. In their study, increase in marginal cost of additional child lead to
higher outcome for their quality, held those children’s quantity constant; increase in marginal cost
of children’s quality lead to higher outcome for their quantity, held their quality constant. Becker,
Murphy, and Tamura (1990) modeled this negative correlation into a endogenous growth model,
which generates two steady states for society: when human capital stock is scare, society chooses
large family size and few investment in children’s quality; when human capital stock is abundant,
society chooses small family size and huge investment in children’s quality. Later in Tamura, Simon
and Murphy (2016), school efficiency was introduced as a parameter into marginal costs of quantity
and quality to capture the difference in transforming schooling years spent on children into human
capital obtained by children. And a slight decrease in school efficiency can produce a large decrease
in years of schooling but a small increase in number of children born. Incorporating this parameter,
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school efficiency, makes the theoretical model capable of explaining the phenomenon that relatively
large variations in human capital investment in children is even associated with small variations in
family sizes across regions.
In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, hu-
man capital investment, intergenerational transfer from child to parents, based on Tamura, Simon
and Murphy (2016) and Boldrin and Jones (2002). The theory provides an understanding on the
relationship between quantity and quality of children: mid-age workers invest on their children’s
quantity and quality, not only to receive positive utility from number of children, but also to re-
ceive more financial support from children in later period; but with the budget constraint, mid-age
workers have to tradeoff investment in quantity (quality) against quality (quantity). The model is
developed to discuss the effect of one-child policy on economic growth in China after 1980. This
policy imposed a strict fertility restriction on family. That is, it allow most families to have only
one child. After the policy enacted, a relatively large variation in human capital investment that
measured by expected years of schooling, is still observed across provinces in China. To absorb the
distinct differences across provinces, schooling efficiency, is used as a key parameter to measure the
time cost spent on each child for an additional year of schooling the child obtains. It plays an im-
portant role to produce the differences in educational outcomes for provinces with strict restrictions
on family size.
According to the theoretical model, data on real GDP, number of workers, real physical stock
and expected years of schooling are used to produce the theoretical school efficiency, but data on
expenditure on education are not used. This paper compares model school efficiency with data
school efficiency constructed from educational expenditure data and other data, by the means of
OLS and fixed effect regressions. The statistical results prove that theoretical data is consistent with
real data. This is in the same line with the findings of Tamura, Simon and Murphy (2016), and it
provides an evidence that the theoretical model is reasonable and capable of describing economic
behavior.
The paper is organized as the following: Section 2.2 present the data used for calibration and
regression analysis; Section 2.3 describe the theoretical model and key equations used for calibration;
Section 2.4 present regression analysis; Section 2.5 is the conclusion.
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2.2 Data Description
In this section, I discuss how I construct provincial level data, and describe the Dataset I use to test
implications from the theoretical model.
Expected years of schooling. Expected years of schooling data consists of provincial annual
observations covering the period from 1949 to 2010. Those data are constructed from primary
school enrollment rates, secondary school enrollment rates and higher education enrollment rates,
according to this formula: for a child of age 7 at year t, expected years of schooling he will attain is
the sum of primary school enrollment rates from year t to t+ 5, secondary school enrollment rates
from year t+ 6 to t+ 11 and higher education enrollment rates from year t+ 12 to t+ 16. Since the
enrollment rates data only spans the time period of 1949-2010, for children born after year 1985 the
forward higher education enrollment rates are not available. Following the procedure in Murphy,
Simon and Tamura (2008), I use the linear projections of three enrollment rates on time trend, of
which primary school enrollment rates are truncated by 1 if projected values are above 1.
The annual primary school enrollment rates, used to constructed expected years of schooling, start
in 1949 and end in 2010, covering 30 provinces, obtained from published book China’s Provincial
Statistics: 1949-1982 and from China Statistic Yearbooks. The primary school ages in China are
from 7 to 12. For annual enrollment rates for secondary school and higher education, the school
ages are from 13 to 18 and from 19 to 23, respectively. The data are constructed for each province
i, by the formulae:
enrolment rates for secondary schooli,t =
the number of students in secondary schooli,t
population of ages 13-18i,t
.
enrolment rates for higher educationi,t =
the number of students in higher education instituioni,t
population of ages 19-23i,t
.
Where the population distribution since 1982 are calculated from the raw data obtained from each
provinces’ statistical yearbooks, the population of ages 13-18 for year t before 1982 are estimated by
the population of ages 7-12 for year t−1, and the population of ages 19-23 for year t before 1982 are
estimated by the sum of newborns 19-23 years ago from that year with the assumption that these
groups of people do not move across provinces since birth.
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Real physical capital stock. Annual data during 1953-2005 on real physical capital stock are in
1953 price, obtained from Yanrui Wu (2009).
Real regional GDP. Annual real regional GDP for each province are constructed by nominal
regional GDP, real GDP growth, and GDP deflator of the base year (1953). Since National Bureau
of Statistics of China do not report real GDP at provincial level, but nominal GDP levels and
real GDP growth for each province are provided. So nominal regional GDP and real regional GDP
growth from 1949-2008 are obtained from China Compendium of Statistics: 1949-2008, and the data
from 2009-2010 are obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks (2010 and 2011). The Year-over-year
real GDP growth rates for each province are used to construct the growth rate of each provinces
deflator. And GDP deflator of the base year (1953) is normalized to one.
Number of workers and number of students. Annual data during 1949-2008 are from “China
Compendium of Statistics: 1949-2008”. Annual data during 2009-2010 are from China Statistical
Yearbooks (2010 and 2011).
Real school efficiency. School efficiency is the time efficiency of education time. It is defined
as how much time parents have to spend for an additional year of schooling their child attains. In
this paper, based on Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016), the time cost for total expected years of
schooling is measured by the share of output per worker spent on education per student according
to the following:
Sdatat =
[nominal government educational expenditure]t
[nominal GDP]t
[number of employed workers]t
[number of students]t
To construct the time cost for each province, I collected annual provincial data on nominal educa-
tional expenditure, nominal GDP, number of employed workers, number of students, and expected
years of schooling from 1960-1988 and from 1998-2000.




where τdatat is the estimated expected years of schooling divided by 20 years.
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2.3 Model and Theoretical School Efficiency
Based on Boldrin and Jones (2002), Murphy, Tamura and Simon (2008), We develop a parsimonious
3-period overlapping generation model with endogenous fertility, human capital accumulation and
intergenerational transfer. The set-up is meant to capture the feature of Chinese society: children
are considered as a source of old-age support.
2.3.1 Model
Consider an overlapping generation model where people live up to three time periods: youth, middle-
age and old-age. Let Nt denote the population of mid-age people at time t. The total population,
denoted as Ntotal,t, is the sum of the number of young, mid-age and old-age people. That is,
Ntotal,t = Nt+1 +Nt +Nt−1. Suppose that in period t, old-age agents depend on the support from
mid-age agents and their savings to live. Mid-age agents work for one period and make decisions on
quantity-quality of children, along with transfer to parents , siblings’ transfer are taken as given.
Preferences. The life-time utility for mid-age agent includes the consumption at middle-age cm,t,
the consumption at old-age co,t+1, parent’s consumption at old-age co,t ,the benefits from having
children:
Ut = lncm,t + δlnxt + ηlnco,t + βlnco,t+1
where xt = nt(1 − ρt). nt is the number of children born by each individual, and ρt is the young
adult mortality rate at time t, considered as exogenous.
Budget constraints. The mid-age individual faces two resource constraints and one time constraint
at time t:





1 = lt + xt(τtλt + ν)
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where ν is the fixed minimum time needed to rear each child, τt is the time spent on educating each
child, λt is the time efficiency of educating, πt is the amount of transfers to parents. And here I
assume that every child take their siblings’ transfer as given. Agent in mid-age rears and educates
children, make earnings by working lt hours, lends (or borrows) at amount at market-determined
interest rate Rt+1 and transfers part of earnings ,πt, to parent. When come to old-age, agent
receives transfer from children, collects (or pays) principal and interest if he lent (or borrowed). The
intergenerational transfers from mid-age worker to their old parents act as a channel through which
parents have incentive to invest in quantity and quality of children.1
The mid-age agent’s earning at period t is determined by the amount of time allocated on working,
the human capital ht the agent has, and the wage rate wt.
mt = wtht(1− xt(τtλt + ν))
Production.The production side of the economy is given by an aggregate production function
Yt = F (Kt, ztHt)




Assuming capital depreciation rate is ζ at the end of every period, the dynamics of physical capital
accumulation is given by
Kt = Nt−1at−1 + (1− ζ)Kt−1.
And Ht is the aggregate stock of human capital used for producing goods, which is given by
Ht = htltNt = ht
(
1− xt(τtλt + ν)
)
Nt
1The incorporation of endogenous transfer from children to parents not only put forward a fundamentally reason
for rearing and educating children, but also drives a dynamic transition on fertility choices. See Appendix A for more
details.
2In this paper, gt specially refer to growth rate of productivity generated from institutional improvements and
economic reforms in China.
73
3 Therefore, the production function at time t is specified by











By solving firm’s profit maximization problem, F (Kt, zthtltNt) − wthtltNt − RtKt by choosing Nt
and Kt, get














, per capita physical capital stock.
Market clear condition.The whole economy faces a market clear condition at every period.
Yt = (cm,t + at)Nt + co,tNt−1.
Human capital accumulation. The current per capita human capital in the economy is assumed
to be determined by last generation’s per capita human capital, per capita investment made by last
generation and the productivity to produce human capital, A :
ht+1 = Ahtτt
.
2.3.2 Optimal Decision on Educational Investment
Mid-age agent maximizes life-time utility by choosing the number of children nt, the investment on
children’s education τt, the transfer to parents πt, the amount of capital to lend (or borrow) at.
According to first order conditions with respect to nt, τt, at and πt, we can obtain the following
3ht is the effective per capita human capital used in producing output. lt = 1 − xt(τtλt + ν) is how much time
spent on working. Therefore, according to the definitions the marginal product of human capital is actually the wage
rate of per unit of human capital, which is wage per unit of time per unit of human capital.
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equation to calibrate theoretical school efficiency4 :




The equation implies that the optimal human capital investment can be determined by equate the
marginal cost of educating children, that is the first term in RHS, to the additional benefit from one
more unit of human capital investment, that is the second term.
Theoretical school efficiency. To recovery the theoretical school efficiency for each province,
provincial data on employed labour, real GDP, real capital stock, expected years of schooling are
collected and used. According to the eq.(2.1), we have
0 =
(1− α)ytλtτt








where yt is real GDP per worker, xt is employment growth, kt is real capital stock, and τt is the
ratio of expected years of schooling to 20 years. Due to the missing data on Tibet, Chongqing, and
Hainan, 28 provinces’ school efficiency during different time periods are calibrated and presented in
Table 1.1.
2.4 Regression Analysis
To parametric the model and calibrate the school efficiency, I use data on expected years of schooling,
real GDP, real capital stock, employment, but don’t use any data on educational expenditure. In the
section, we use provincial data on school efficiency constructed from public educational expenditure
and other information, and use empirical regression to produce measures of goodness of fit of the
4The procedure to get the equations is a little bit complicated, and more detail can be found in my job market
paper
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models solutions with the data. Now consider the two following regression equations:
λdatat = α+ βλ
model
t
lnλdatat = α+ βlnλ
model
t
Table 2.1 records the results for regression of average λdatat on λ
model
t . Since any observation of
λmodelt are for time period of 1960-1980 or of 1980-2000, we calculated the average λ
data
t for 1960-
1980 and for 1980-2000 in provincial level. And because theoretical model captures the enforcement
of one-child policy, λmodelt contains information about the effect of one-child policy. Therefore in
this paper we only focus on statistical results generated by regressions without control for one-child
policy, although we still present result of the case with one-child policy as a reference.
In Table 2.1, slope coefficients with and without control are positive and statistically significant,
and introducing an control variable for one-child policy hurts the explanatory power. In table 2.2,
we present the results for log-log regressions. Without any control variable, the slope coefficient is
positive and significant in 0.1% level, and the R̄2 are 0.28. Although we reject the hypothesis that
α = 0 and β = 1, we cannot reject β = 1 in 5% significant level. It is clear that theoretical model
can produce the time series on school efficiency quite a bit of consistent with reality.
Table 2.3-2.6 show the results for regression relating annual λdatat on λ
model
t . Here, I introduce a
dummy variable to control for 9-year compulsory education policy period (after 1994). That is,
Dschooli,t =

1, if in compulsory education policy period.
0, if not.
(2.2)
In table 2.3, slope coefficients are positive and significant in 5% level with and without controls, but
R̄2 is very small. Table 2.4 produces the results for log-log regressions. The slope coefficient are all
positive, very close to one, and significant in 0.1% level with and without controls.The first column
in table 2.4 records the regression results for the case without any control, that shows β is 1.015
and we cannot reject the hull hypothesis that β is one in 5% significant level. The third column
records the regression results for the case with a control on compulsory education policy. It suggests
that β is 1.075, and we still cannot reject the null hypothesis that β is one in 5% significant level.
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Compared with the case without any control variable, introducing the dummy variable to control
for compulsory education policy period can slightly improve R̄2, from 19.58% to 20.37%. Despite
that we reject the null hypothesis that α = 0 andβ = 1, the closeness of β to one and relatively high
R̄2 provide evidence that model data fit real data with quite a bit of success.
Table 2.5 and 2.6 show the results for fixed effect regression relating annual λdatat on λ
model
t . The
regression equations are the following,
λdatai,t = α+ βλ
model
i,t + νi + ui,t
lnλdatai,t = α+ βlnλ
model
i,t + νi + ui,t
We introduce fixed effect coefficient to control for specific effect of each province. More specifically,
there are 28 provinces in dataset. In table 2.5, the third column records the regression results for
the case with a control on compulsory education policy period, which has p value of 0.0878. That
means the significant level of the test is 8.78%. Since the null hypothesis is that α is zero and β is
one, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at any significant level of below than 8.78%. In table 2.6,
although we reject the null hypothesis that α = 0 andβ = 1, we still cannot reject that β = 1 and
R̄’s are improved to about 37%.
To further examine the relationship between data and λmodel, we consider the following regression
equation:
∆λdatai,t = α+ β∆λ
model
i,t + ui,t
Where ∆λdatai,t = λ
data
i,t+20 − λdatai,t , and ∆λmodeli,t = λmodeli,t+20 − λmodeli,t . And the regression results
are presented in table 2.7. These regressions have very small R̄’s, and statistically insignificant
coefficients. However, as the last row of the table shows , the regression without any control has
p value of 0.426, which is the significant level of the test that α is zero and β is one. That means
we cannot reject the hypothesis at any significant level below 42.6%. Also, for the regression with
a control on compulsory education policy, we cannot reject the hypothesis at any significant level




The correlation between theoretical school efficiency and real cost of schooling are examined in this
paper. In five of seven tables, we cannot reject the hypothesis that β is one. In two tables we cannot
reject the hypothesis that α is zero and β is one. Among these, we find a very strong evidence that
relationship between the change in real data and the change in model data is one-to-one. Beside
that, introducing the control variable for compulsory education policy and log specification can
improve explanatory power of regressions. And introducing the control variable for one-child cannot
obviously improve statistical results, because model data already contain information about the
effect of this policy.These statistical analysis suggest that theoretical data is consistent with real
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2.7 Appendix A: Tables










Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
80










Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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Table 2.3: Pooled regressions of data on model solutions.
λdata λdata λdata λdata
β 0.403∗ 0.441∗ 0.440∗ 0.441∗
(0.174) (0.196) (0.177) (0.196)
α -0.152 -0.163 -0.163 -0.163
(0.105) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109)
One-child No Yes No Yes
compulsory edu No No Yes Yes
N 579 579 579 579
R̄2 0.0076 0.0061 0.0077 0.006
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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Table 2.4: Pooled regressions of data on model solutions.
lnλdata lnλdata lnλdata lnλdata
β 1.015∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗
(0.0855) (0.1000) (0.0882) (0.0999)
α -2.415∗∗∗ -2.299∗∗∗ -2.361∗∗∗ -2.293∗∗∗
(0.0503) (0.0706) (0.0542) (0.0705)
One-child No Yes No Yes
compulsory edu No No Yes Yes
N 576 576 576 576
R̄2 0.1958 0.2019 0.2037 0.2054
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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Table 2.5: Fixed effect regressions of data on model solutions
λdata λdata λdata λdata
β 0.510 1.178 0.629 1.175
(0.324) (0.742) (0.343) (0.742)
α -0.215 -0.552 -0.273 -0.548
(0.193) (0.388) (0.201) (0.388)
One-child No Yes No Yes
compulsory edu No No Yes Yes
N 579 579 579 579
R̄2 0.0093 0.0092 0.0111 0.0101
p 0.0065 0.0882 0.0878 0.0878
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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Table 2.6: Fixed effect regressions of data on model solutions
lnλdata lnλdata lnλdata lnλdata
β 0.835∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.289) (0.136) (0.136)
α -2.415∗∗∗ -2.263∗∗∗ -2.310∗∗∗ -2.310∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.292) (0.148) (0.148)
One-child No Yes No Yes
compulsory edu No No Yes Yes
N 576 576 576 576
R̄2 0.3704 0.3697 0.3757 0.3757
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The final row is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and = 0.
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